Both the code comment and the docs said the interface row is "14 columns for AWG 2.0, 28
for AWG 3.0". That reads as a version signal and it is not one. The width of the row is
decided by the version of amneziawg-tools doing the printing, not by which protocol
parameters the tunnel has configured: AWG 3.0 tools emit the wide row for an AWG 2.0
configuration too, with the newer fields simply zero, empty or (none). Any rule of the
form "N columns means version X" is wrong by construction.
The classifier never relied on column count for that purpose - it discriminates on the
allowed-ips column - so this is a correction to what the code claims about itself and to
what the docs would lead a future change to assume.
Five fixtures added from the audit's list, all previously uncovered:
- AWG 3.0 interface row with header protection disabled: the key column is (none) and the
range fields collapse to single values;
- an AWG 2.0 configuration read through AWG 3.0 tools, asserted to have the same width as
a native AWG 3.0 row and to still be rejected while its peer parses;
- a dump containing several interfaces, each with its own peers;
- an interface with no peers at all;
- malformed rows - truncated, non-numeric handshake, non-CIDR allowed-ips - which must be
skipped rather than partially interpreted.
Docs also pin what was verified and against which versions, rather than stating it as
timeless: AmneziaVPN 5.0.0.5 and the master branches of amneziawg-tools and amneziawg-go
at the time of the change.
amnezia-awg3 is now described as what it is - not a confirmed official name. AmneziaVPN
5.0.0.5 added AWG 3.0 support but still exposes only Awg and Awg2 container variants. It
stays in the example list on purpose, and the reasoning is written down: a name that does
not match costs nothing because the search continues down the list, while a name missing
from the list produces a silent "container not found". This is a deliberate deviation from
the audit's suggestion to build defaults only from names in use today.
cargo fmt --check, clippy -D warnings, and cargo test --locked --workspace --release all
clean: 163 + 4 passed.
The previous implementation had every failure mode a home-grown PID lock has:
- contention was detected by matching the substring "lock already exists" in an error
message, so any change to the message would have turned a busy lock into a hard error;
- stale-lock recovery removed the file and created it again as two separate operations,
so two processes could each decide the lock was stale and each take it;
- a reused PID made a live lock look stale, since the check was only whether /proc/<pid>
exists;
- Drop deleted the lock file, racing with a process that had already opened it and was
sleeping on the retry loop - it would then lock a file that no longer has a directory
entry, and the next arrival would create a fresh one and lock that instead.
Replaced with advisory kernel locking through std::fs::File::try_lock, stabilised in Rust
1.89 and backed by flock on Linux. No new dependency. The kernel releases the lock when
the holder exits by any means, including kill -9, so there is no stale state to reason
about and no recovery heuristic to get wrong. The PID is still written to the file, but
purely as diagnostics - nothing reads it back to make a decision.
The lock file is now never deleted. Its presence carries no meaning; only the lock held
on it does. That removes the race the old Drop introduced.
Five tests: a second acquisition of a live lock fails, timeout reports lock busy timeout,
the lock is free again once the guard drops, the file survives release, and a leftover
file from a previous run does not block acquisition.
Behaviour note for the four call sites (traffic, firewall, sysctl_tuning, swap): timeouts
are unchanged, and a process killed mid-reconcile no longer leaves anything that needs
cleaning up before the next run.
cargo test --workspace: 158 + 4 passed. clippy -D warnings clean.
awg2-harness.service ran ensure-swap from ExecStartPre while the daemon runs it again as
the first step of its own startup. Idempotency kept it harmless, but it cost two locks,
two reads of /proc/swaps, two persistence checks, and split the startup failure path
across two units so an operator reading systemctl status could not tell which invocation
failed. The daemon owns the startup sequence, its error contract and its log stream, so
the ExecStartPre is removed. The standalone ensure-swap subcommand is unaffected.
Type=simple reports a unit as started the moment systemd forks, before the binary is
known to be executable. Type=exec waits for the exec to succeed, so a missing or
non-executable /usr/sbin/awg2-harness fails the unit instead of appearing to start.
Restart policy: the daemon moves from Restart=always to on-failure, matching the
scheduler. A clean exit is deliberate and should not be respawned. For the scheduler this
was already load-bearing and is now documented - it exits 0 both when reboot.enabled is
false and after systemd accepts the reboot request, so Restart=always would have spun it
in a loop on any host with scheduled reboots disabled.
RestartSec=10s with StartLimitBurst=5 over StartLimitIntervalSec=60 could exhaust the
limit in about 50 seconds, which is easy to hit when the daemon is failing because Docker
or the container is still coming up - the restarts burn the budget before the dependency
can recover. Replaced with a stepped backoff, 10 -> 20 -> 40 -> 80 -> 160s via
RestartSteps=4 and RestartMaxDelaySec=160s, and the limit window widened to 15 minutes
with a burst of 10 so a full backoff sequence fits inside it. Both directives require
systemd 254+; Debian 13 ships 257.
Documented alongside, because it is the same lifecycle contract and had no home in the
docs: configuration is read once at process start and a config edit needs a restart of the
affected service. daemon-reload is not involved - it applies to unit files, not to the
application config. ExecReload is deliberately absent, since adding it without real SIGHUP
handling would imply a reload path that does not exist.
Unit files are installed from the repo root by tools/build.sh, which already runs
systemd-analyze verify on the build host when it is available, so these changes are
verified there. Not verifiable in this environment: no Debian, no systemd.
Acceptance checklist gained five checks covering unit verification, the restart-required
contract, single ensure-swap per start, growing backoff, and the scheduler not looping
when reboots are disabled.
Two modules wrote into /etc/sysctl.d and did it differently. sysctl_tuning refused to
touch a file whose first line lacked its marker and cleaned up on disable. swap wrote
/etc/sysctl.d/99-awg2-harness.conf with a different marker, no ownership check at all -
an administrator's file at that path was silently clobbered - and never removed it when
the module was turned off, so vm.swappiness stayed pinned forever.
New module managed_file.rs holds the rules once:
- a read that fails is never an absent file;
- ownership is Absent / Managed / Foreign, decided by the marker on the first line;
- write refuses Foreign, skips when the content already matches, and is otherwise atomic:
temp sibling created with create_new, sync_all, mode 0644, rename, directory flush;
- remove refuses Foreign and treats Absent as success.
Both modules now go through it. sysctl_tuning loses its private write_atomic,
ensure_managed_or_absent and remove_managed_sysctl_file_at.
The swappiness file moves to /etc/sysctl.d/90-awg2-harness-swap.conf with the marker
"# Managed by awg2-harness swap", matching the 90- prefix every other managed file uses.
The old path is removed on first run of the new version, but only when it still carries
the previous "# Managed by awg2-harness" marker; a foreign file there is left alone and
does not fail the migration, since the current file lives elsewhere.
Disable semantics are now explicit: swap.enabled = false removes the managed file and
does nothing else. Runtime vm.swappiness is deliberately not reset - picking a value
would be inventing a policy - and active swap is not deactivated, because merely turning
a feature off should not trigger a destructive action. Previously ensure_swap returned
early and left the persisted file behind.
Also replaced a vacuous test: swappiness_conf_render_is_stable asserted that a string
literal equals a format! of the same literal, touching no production code at all. It now
exercises render_swappiness_conf, and a companion test proves the rendered file is
recognised as managed by the same marker check that guards overwriting it - otherwise
every reconcile would refuse to touch its own output.
Twelve tests: the three ownership states, refusal to overwrite and refusal to remove a
foreign file with content asserted intact, idempotent write, stale temp handling, an
unreadable path reported as an error, plus legacy migration in all three cases - ours,
foreign, absent.
cargo test --workspace: 148 + 4 passed. clippy -D warnings clean.
Two more release blockers in the swap module.
1. Foreign files could be destroyed.
swap.path was validated against a blacklist of exact strings. /etc/../etc/fstab is not
string-equal to /etc/fstab but resolves to it, and nothing normalized the path or
checked the parent chain for symlinks. ensure_desired_swapfile then removed any
existing regular file whose size did not match the configured one, so a mistyped or
hostile path meant deleting /etc/passwd, an application config, or any other regular
file. disable_foreign_swaps additionally deleted foreign swapfiles outright.
Ownership is now explicit. A sidecar marker <swap.path>.awg2-harness-owned sits next to
the managed swapfile, and inspect_swapfile_ownership classifies the path as Missing,
ManagedValid, ManagedWrongSize or Foreign. Foreign is always a hard error - the file is
never resized, rewritten or removed. Foreign active swaps are now only swapped off;
deleting an administrator's swapfile is not this package's call, and swapoff plus the
fstab rewrite already produce the exclusive runtime state.
Path validation is split in two. The lexical half rejects relative paths, '.' and '..'
components, whitespace, control characters and backslashes, the system path list, and
anything under /proc, /sys or /dev; it touches no filesystem, so validate-config stays
side-effect free on a host where the file does not exist yet. It runs after '..' is
rejected, so the string is already normalized and the blacklist cannot be bypassed. The
filesystem half runs just before use and refuses a symlink anywhere in the parent chain,
not only at the final component.
One deliberate deviation from the audit: arbitrary absolute paths stay allowed rather
than being restricted to a fixed managed location. Pinning the path would break
deployments that already configured their own, and the ownership marker is the guard
that actually prevents data loss - a wrong path can now only fail, never destroy.
2. The migration order left the host swapless on failure.
ensure_swap ran disable_foreign_swaps first, then created the swapfile, then activated
it. Any failure in fallocate, dd, mkswap or swapon after that first step left the host
with no swap at all - on a box provisioned with swap precisely because it is short on
memory.
The sequence is now a transaction: preflight, prepare the managed swapfile, swapon,
verify it actually appears in the active list, and only then swapoff the others,
rewrite fstab, apply swappiness and verify. Nothing destructive happens until the
replacement is confirmed live. The one unavoidable gap is deactivating our own swap to
resize it, which cannot be done in place; foreign swap stays up throughout.
chmod 0600 now also happens before mkswap, so the file is never briefly world-readable
while it already holds swap structure.
config.rs no longer carries its own copy of the path blacklist and calls the shared
validator.
Twelve tests: the four ownership states, refusal to recreate a foreign file with its
content asserted intact afterwards, '..' traversal, dangerous and virtual paths,
whitespace and control characters, relative and directory paths, a missing parent
directory, an accepted chain, and a symlinked parent (unix only).
Docs updated: IMPLEMENTATION_SPEC section 17 gained the ownership table, the ordered
transaction and the path rules; CONFIGURATION and the acceptance checklist gained the
operator-facing constraints and nine checks.
cargo test --workspace: 136 + 4 passed. clippy -D warnings clean.
Two release blockers, both in the most destructive operation the package performs.
1. An unreadable /etc/fstab was treated as an empty one.
let content = fs::read_to_string(fstab_path).unwrap_or_default();
PermissionDenied, an I/O error, a damaged filesystem and "file absent" all collapsed
into an empty string. The rewrite then emitted a fstab containing only the managed swap
line and installed it atomically and successfully, dropping the root and boot mounts.
Consequence: a host that does not boot, guarded by one unwrap_or_default. The same
masking was present in read_fstab_swap_entries, so an unreadable fstab was reported by
status as "no swap entries", which reads as healthy drift-free state.
2. The backup was best-effort.
let _ = fs::write(bak_path, &content);
If it failed, the rewrite proceeded anyway. IMPLEMENTATION_SPEC and the acceptance
checklist both asserted the backup exists. The scenario where the backup fails is
exactly the scenario where it is needed.
New module fstab.rs owns the operation:
- read_required distinguishes NotFound from every other error and fails on both. A
missing /etc/fstab on Debian is an anomaly, not a blank slate, so it is never created;
- a blank candidate is refused outright;
- the backup is mandatory and flushed before the temp file is created, so there is no
window where the target is about to be replaced and no recovery copy exists;
- two copies are kept: .awg2-harness.bak is the state before the current rewrite,
.awg2-harness.original is written once with create_new and holds the host as it was
before this package first touched it;
- the temp file is a sibling of the target, created with create_new, sync_all'd, and
inherits the original permissions; a stale temp from a killed run is removed explicitly
rather than reused;
- the candidate is validated with findmnt --verify --tab-file before the swap. The step is
skipped when findmnt cannot be spawned; a rejection is fatal;
- commit is an atomic rename followed by a directory fsync;
- after the rename the target is re-read and compared to what was written. A mismatch
restores the backup and fails.
Also fixed: render_fstab_line interpolated the path raw. fstab fields are
whitespace-separated, so a space or tab in swap.path would shift every following column.
Paths now go through octal escaping (\040, \011, \012, \134).
Ten tests, all portable - the "unreadable but present" case is exercised by pointing the
reader at a directory, which fails as a non-NotFound error on every platform. Covered:
unreadable target is an error rather than an empty file, missing target is an error,
backup failure leaves the target byte-identical, blank candidate refused, unchanged
candidate is a no-op that writes no backup, the pristine copy survives repeated rewrites,
a stale temp does not block commit, and field escaping.
Docs updated: IMPLEMENTATION_SPEC section 17 gained the full rewrite contract, the
acceptance checklist gained seven checks including the two failure modes above.
cargo test --workspace: 124 + 4 passed, ten new. clippy -D warnings clean.
firewall.rs held two subsystems that share nothing but the nft command layer: the host
INPUT firewall, applied in the host namespace and owning inet awg2_host_firewall, and the
anti-torrent guard, applied in the namespace chosen by config and owning inet
awg2_harness. The split follows that boundary rather than an inspect/apply one:
firewall/mod.rs apply_firewall, namespace selection, shared table constants
firewall/nft.rs text normalization and the nft command wrappers
firewall/host.rs host INPUT firewall and its 5 tests
firewall/antitorrent.rs connection-count guard and its 6 tests
Production logic is unchanged. Function sets before and after are identical: 25 against
25, verified by extracting names from the old blob and the four new files and diffing.
Not a pure move in one respect, stated here so it is not a surprise in review: the test
module contained four near-identical 45-line Config literals, about 180 lines of
copy-paste, differing only in the single field each test actually cared about. Carrying
four copies into the new files would have knowingly propagated the duplication, so they
collapse into one test_config() helper in firewall/mod.rs that tests mutate. This is why
the four files total 875 lines against the old 890 despite gaining doc comments.
Doc comments now record the reasoning that was only implicit before: why nft output is
compared after normalization (rendering differs across versions - quoting, comma-separated
ct state lists, brace layout), why the host firewall batch never contains a delete (a
partially applied INPUT chain could lock out SSH), why ct state new is load-bearing in the
anti-torrent rule, why connlimit_state_present accepts two renderings, and why the
anti-torrent rule defaults to the container namespace.
IMPLEMENTATION_SPEC section 3 is updated: it described the old flat layout and carried the
split as an unfulfilled intention. Both traffic and firewall now match what it documents.
cargo test --workspace: 110 + 4 passed, unchanged count. clippy -D warnings clean.
print_status and print_degraded_sections carried four byte-identical blocks - host
firewall (25 lines), anti-torrent (24), last actions (9) and recent events (10) - plus a
Conntrack block that was the same logic assembled differently and a Traffic desired block
of four printlns. Roughly 80 lines of copy-paste with no test covering either copy, so a
format change applied to one path would have silently diverged from the other. The
divergence would only ever be visible while the container is down, which is the worst
moment to discover the diagnostic output is wrong.
Every shared section is now one function called from both paths:
print_traffic_desired_section, print_host_firewall_section, print_antitorrent_section,
print_conntrack_section, print_last_actions_section, print_recent_events_section. The file
already had this shape for print_swap_status and print_reboot_section; the pattern is now
followed consistently. The Docker/Amnezia port path block keeps two variants because they
genuinely differ - real values against unknown - but the shared FORWARD ownership note is
a single constant.
The runtime state paths were also duplicated across modules: status.rs re-declared the
literals that daemon.rs already owns. daemon::LAST_STATE_FILE and daemon::EVENTS_FILE are
now pub and reused, and the recent-events window is a named constant instead of a bare 10.
Ordering fix in the same function: print_network_tuning_status ran between the service
line and the container lines, so container/container_id/pid/netns/interface appeared under
the "Network tuning:" header at the same two-space indent as its fields. Container
identity is now printed inside the discovery match, before any other section opens, in
both the healthy and degraded paths. Field names are unchanged; only the order of two
blocks moved. IMPLEMENTATION_SPEC section 15 documented the old order and is updated.
print_degraded_sections returned anyhow::Result<()> while never failing; it returns unit
now.
status.rs: 645 -> 602 lines. cargo test --workspace: 110 + 4 passed. clippy -D warnings
clean.
The docs folder had drifted into a mixed-language contract: IMPLEMENTATION_SPEC.md was
entirely in English while the rest was Russian with English headings. Prose is now
Russian throughout; English is kept only where it is technically load-bearing (commands,
tool output, config keys, file/module/table names, tc handles) and for terms with no
settled Russian equivalent in this context (drift, reconcile, peer, namespace, handshake).
docs/README.md now states that contract explicitly.
Rewriting the spec surfaced several places where it described intent rather than the
code. Corrected against traffic_core/src:
- module layout: the spec showed traffic/ and firewall/ as directories with
model/inspect/apply submodules. They are single files, and sysctl_tuning.rs was
missing from the tree entirely.
- data model: Peer was documented as carrying public key, handshake and counters. It
carries only ipv4; runtime state lives in a separate PeerRuntime, and there is no
desired-state struct at all - it is derived inline from config plus sorted peers.
RuntimeTarget.netns_path is a String, not a PathBuf.
- interface detection: the spec listed a third step taking the first non-loopback
interface with an IPv4 address. No such fallback exists; detection bails with an
explicit error, which is safer and is now documented as deliberate.
- reconcile: the pseudo-flow folded firewall into reconcile_traffic. They are two
independent reconciles with separate locks.
- locking: only traffic.lock was documented. There are three locks, and
sysctl_tuning.lock has a 30s timeout rather than 10s. Stale-lock recovery via
/proc/<pid> was undocumented.
- sysctl_tuning: the module also manages /etc/modules-load.d/90-awg2-harness-bbr.conf
when BBR is active, and refuses to touch either managed file without its marker.
Both docs and the acceptance checklist claimed only the sysctl.d file was written.
- status contract: the documented output was outdated. All 15 printed sections are now
listed in the order status.rs emits them, including the degraded path when no container
is found, and the fact that the Network tuning block is printed between the System
service line and the container lines.
- swap: size was documented as a constant 2048 MB instead of swap.size_mb, and the
/etc/fstab.awg2-harness.bak backup was undocumented.
- apply/verify: the tolerated-error lists are now the actual closed sets from the code.
Acceptance checklist gained checks for the daemon startup failure policy (sysctl/swap
fatal, traffic/firewall not), lock contention and stale-lock recovery, degraded status,
the modules-load file, and the marker guard. The stale host wg requirement was dropped
from its host-tools item.
Every path, table, counter and log string quoted in the docs was verified to exist in
the source. cargo test --workspace: 110 + 4 passed.
Peer discovery is now the single owner of how wg is invoked and parsed.
wg.rs:
- resolve the binary through ordered amnezia.wg_binaries (default [awg, wg]);
awg is the real binary in the official image and wg is a symlink to it, so awg is
tried first and wg stays for plain WireGuard containers. No probe call: resolution
is a property of the command being run anyway.
- drop the nsenter fallback. AmneziaWG is userspace and its UAPI socket lives under
RUNSTATEDIR/amneziawg/ in the container mount namespace, while host wireguard-tools
looks under /var/run/wireguard/. nsenter -n enters only the network namespace, so
that path could never return peers.
- classify dump lines structurally instead of by column count. The AWG interface line
is longer than a peer line (14 columns on AWG 2.0, 28 on AWG 3.0) and its
handshake/rx/tx positions hold junk-packet sizes that parse as integers, so only the
allowed-ips column discriminates. Column 1 of an interface line is the device private
key, which the previous heuristic rejected only incidentally.
- fix allowed-ips parsing: `show all allowed-ips` separates a peer's addresses with
spaces, not commas, so peers with more than one allowed IP were shaped on their first
address only and the rest ran unlimited.
- collapse the three duplicated /32-in-CIDR filters into one tokenizer shared by the
allowed-ips, dump and pretty-print parsers.
config.rs:
- add amnezia.wg_binaries with serde default, validated as bare command names
(non-empty, no whitespace, no path separators) since they execute inside the
container. Existing deployed configs keep parsing unchanged.
- remove host wg from the required-tool preflight. It gated daemon startup on
wireguard-tools for a code path that produced nothing.
status.rs:
- discover peers once instead of twice per status call and degrade gracefully like the
neighbouring sections instead of aborting the whole output.
Tests: real AWG 3.0 / AWG 2.0 / plain WireGuard interface-line fixtures, AWG 3.0 range
keepalive, space-separated allowed-ips, binary resolution order, and a test that parses
and validates the shipped config.example.toml.
Добавлен отдельный host-level модуль sysctl_tuning без легаси-подходов: managed sysctl файл, точечный reconcile через sysctl -w только для drifted ключей, режимы tcp_bbr off/auto/require, безопасное удаление только managed-файла и атомарная запись конфигурации.
Интегрированы новые CLI-команды apply-network-tuning/inspect-network-tuning, startup reconcile в daemon и секция Network tuning в status. Расширены config/defaults/валидация, обновлен пример конфига и документация. Добавлены unit-тесты для config и sysctl_tuning.
- Полностью переписан swap-модуль в режиме exclusive ownership\n- Добавлены verify/checks, статус фактического swap-state и drift\n- Интегрирован ensure-swap в daemon и systemd ExecStartPre\n- Усилен lock API (таймауты) и применение в traffic/firewall/swap\n- Усилен parser firewall (JSON-first + устойчивый text fallback)\n- Обновлены config validation, runtime tools и default priority\n- Синхронизированы docs и build/package hygiene\n- Удалены member Cargo.lock в пользу корневого lockfile
Добавлен package-режим в tools/build.sh: --package, --dist-dir, --version. Реализована сборка Debian-пакета, metadata/control, postinst/postrm и SHA256SUMS. Установочные пути унифицированы под /usr/sbin и /lib/systemd/system для production-модели.
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