//! Host INPUT firewall, owned table `inet awg2_host_firewall`.
//!
//! Applied in the host namespace only. The table is scoped so that disabling the module
//! removes exactly what it created and nothing that Docker, Amnezia or the operator owns.

use crate::{config::Config, netns::build_host_transport};

use super::{
    HOST_FW_TABLE,
    nft::{is_nft_not_found, normalize_nft_text, run_allow_notfound, run_nft_batch},
};

pub(super) fn apply_host_firewall(cfg: &Config) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    let transport = build_host_transport();
    if !cfg.host_firewall.enabled {
        run_allow_notfound(
            transport.as_ref(),
            &["nft", "delete", "table", "inet", HOST_FW_TABLE],
        )?;
        return Ok(());
    }

    if host_firewall_drift_reason(cfg)?.is_none() {
        return Ok(());
    }

    let policy = cfg
        .host_firewall
        .default_input_policy
        .trim()
        .to_ascii_lowercase();

    run_allow_notfound(
        transport.as_ref(),
        &["nft", "delete", "table", "inet", HOST_FW_TABLE],
    )?;

    apply_host_firewall_batch(cfg, &policy)?;

    if let Some(reason) = host_firewall_drift_reason(cfg)? {
        anyhow::bail!("host firewall verify-after-apply failed: {reason}");
    }
    Ok(())
}

fn apply_host_firewall_batch(cfg: &Config, policy: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    let batch = build_host_firewall_batch_script(cfg, policy);
    run_nft_batch(&batch)
}

/// Renders the desired INPUT chain.
///
/// The script never contains `delete table`: deletion happens as a separate step before
/// the batch, so a batch that fails to parse cannot take the existing rules down with it.
fn build_host_firewall_batch_script(cfg: &Config, policy: &str) -> String {
    let mut batch = String::new();
    batch.push_str(&format!("add table inet {HOST_FW_TABLE}\n"));
    batch.push_str(&format!(
        "add chain inet {HOST_FW_TABLE} input {{ type filter hook input priority filter; policy {policy}; }}\n"
    ));
    batch.push_str(&format!(
        "add rule inet {HOST_FW_TABLE} input iif \"lo\" accept\n"
    ));
    batch.push_str(&format!(
        "add rule inet {HOST_FW_TABLE} input ct state established,related accept\n"
    ));
    batch.push_str(&format!(
        "add rule inet {HOST_FW_TABLE} input tcp dport {} accept\n",
        cfg.host_firewall.ssh_port
    ));
    for proto in &cfg.host_firewall.amnezia_protocols {
        let p = proto.trim().to_ascii_lowercase();
        batch.push_str(&format!(
            "add rule inet {HOST_FW_TABLE} input {p} dport {} accept\n",
            cfg.host_firewall.amnezia_port
        ));
    }
    if cfg.host_firewall.allow_icmp {
        batch.push_str(&format!(
            "add rule inet {HOST_FW_TABLE} input ip protocol icmp accept\n"
        ));
        batch.push_str(&format!(
            "add rule inet {HOST_FW_TABLE} input ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 accept\n"
        ));
    }
    batch
}

pub fn host_firewall_drift_reason(cfg: &Config) -> anyhow::Result<Option<String>> {
    if !cfg.host_firewall.enabled {
        return Ok(None);
    }
    let transport = build_host_transport();
    let table = match transport.run(&["nft", "list", "table", "inet", HOST_FW_TABLE]) {
        Ok(out) => out,
        Err(e) if is_nft_not_found(&e.to_string()) => return Ok(Some("missing nft table".into())),
        Err(e) => return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("host firewall inspect failed: {e}")),
    };
    let nt = normalize_nft_text(&table);
    Ok(host_firewall_drift_reason_from_text(&nt, cfg))
}

/// Checks the normalized ruleset against config. Returns the first missing piece.
///
/// SSH is checked before anything optional: locking the operator out is the one failure
/// mode of this module that cannot be repaired remotely.
fn host_firewall_drift_reason_from_text(nt: &str, cfg: &Config) -> Option<String> {
    let ssh = format!("tcp dport {} accept", cfg.host_firewall.ssh_port);
    if !nt.contains("chain input") {
        return Some("missing input chain".into());
    }
    if !nt.contains("type filter hook input") {
        return Some("missing input hook".into());
    }
    let pol = format!(
        "policy {}",
        cfg.host_firewall
            .default_input_policy
            .trim()
            .to_ascii_lowercase()
    );
    if !nt.contains(&pol) {
        return Some("wrong input policy".into());
    }
    if !nt.contains("iif lo accept") {
        return Some("missing loopback allow".into());
    }
    if !has_established_related_rule(nt) {
        return Some("missing established/related allow".into());
    }
    if !nt.contains(&ssh) {
        return Some("missing ssh allow rule".into());
    }
    for proto in &cfg.host_firewall.amnezia_protocols {
        let p = proto.trim().to_ascii_lowercase();
        let need = format!("{p} dport {} accept", cfg.host_firewall.amnezia_port);
        if !nt.contains(&need) {
            return Some(format!("missing amnezia allow rule for {p}"));
        }
    }
    if cfg.host_firewall.allow_icmp {
        if !nt.contains("ip protocol icmp accept") {
            return Some("missing icmp allow rule".into());
        }
        if !(nt.contains("ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 accept")
            || nt.contains("ip6 nexthdr ipv6-icmp accept"))
        {
            return Some("missing icmpv6 allow rule".into());
        }
    }
    None
}

/// `nft` renders the state list in either order depending on version.
fn has_established_related_rule(nt: &str) -> bool {
    nt.contains("ct state established related accept")
        || nt.contains("ct state related established accept")
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use crate::firewall::tests::test_config;

    #[test]
    fn host_firewall_parser_tolerates_quoted_lo_and_ipv6_icmp_alias() {
        let table = r#"
table inet awg2_host_firewall {
  chain input {
    type filter hook input priority filter; policy drop;
    iif "lo" accept
    ct state established,related accept
    tcp dport 2323 accept
    udp dport 443 accept
    ip protocol icmp accept
    ip6 nexthdr ipv6-icmp accept
  }
}
"#;
        let cfg = test_config();
        let nt = normalize_nft_text(table);
        assert_eq!(host_firewall_drift_reason_from_text(&nt, &cfg), None);
    }

    #[test]
    fn normalized_established_related_rule_matches() {
        let nt = normalize_nft_text("ct state established,related accept");
        assert!(nt.contains("ct state established related accept"));
        assert!(has_established_related_rule(&nt));
    }

    #[test]
    fn host_firewall_drift_detects_missing_established_related_rule() {
        let table = r#"
table inet awg2_host_firewall {
  chain input {
    type filter hook input priority filter; policy drop;
    iif "lo" accept
    tcp dport 2323 accept
    udp dport 443 accept
    ip protocol icmp accept
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 accept
  }
}
"#;
        let cfg = test_config();
        let nt = normalize_nft_text(table);
        assert_eq!(
            host_firewall_drift_reason_from_text(&nt, &cfg),
            Some("missing established/related allow".into())
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn host_firewall_batch_script_does_not_include_delete_table() {
        let cfg = test_config();
        let script = build_host_firewall_batch_script(&cfg, "drop");
        assert!(script.contains("add table inet awg2_host_firewall"));
        assert!(!script.contains("delete table inet awg2_host_firewall"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn host_firewall_policy_drift_check_trims_policy_value() {
        let table = r#"
table inet awg2_host_firewall {
  chain input {
    type filter hook input priority filter; policy drop;
    iif "lo" accept
    ct state established,related accept
    tcp dport 2323 accept
    udp dport 443 accept
    ip protocol icmp accept
    ip6 nexthdr icmpv6 accept
  }
}
"#;
        let mut cfg = test_config();
        cfg.host_firewall.default_input_policy = " drop ".into();
        let nt = normalize_nft_text(table);
        assert_eq!(host_firewall_drift_reason_from_text(&nt, &cfg), None);
    }
}