Peer discovery is now the single owner of how wg is invoked and parsed. wg.rs: - resolve the binary through ordered amnezia.wg_binaries (default [awg, wg]); awg is the real binary in the official image and wg is a symlink to it, so awg is tried first and wg stays for plain WireGuard containers. No probe call: resolution is a property of the command being run anyway. - drop the nsenter fallback. AmneziaWG is userspace and its UAPI socket lives under RUNSTATEDIR/amneziawg/ in the container mount namespace, while host wireguard-tools looks under /var/run/wireguard/. nsenter -n enters only the network namespace, so that path could never return peers. - classify dump lines structurally instead of by column count. The AWG interface line is longer than a peer line (14 columns on AWG 2.0, 28 on AWG 3.0) and its handshake/rx/tx positions hold junk-packet sizes that parse as integers, so only the allowed-ips column discriminates. Column 1 of an interface line is the device private key, which the previous heuristic rejected only incidentally. - fix allowed-ips parsing: `show all allowed-ips` separates a peer's addresses with spaces, not commas, so peers with more than one allowed IP were shaped on their first address only and the rest ran unlimited. - collapse the three duplicated /32-in-CIDR filters into one tokenizer shared by the allowed-ips, dump and pretty-print parsers. config.rs: - add amnezia.wg_binaries with serde default, validated as bare command names (non-empty, no whitespace, no path separators) since they execute inside the container. Existing deployed configs keep parsing unchanged. - remove host wg from the required-tool preflight. It gated daemon startup on wireguard-tools for a code path that produced nothing. status.rs: - discover peers once instead of twice per status call and degrade gracefully like the neighbouring sections instead of aborting the whole output. Tests: real AWG 3.0 / AWG 2.0 / plain WireGuard interface-line fixtures, AWG 3.0 range keepalive, space-separated allowed-ips, binary resolution order, and a test that parses and validates the shipped config.example.toml.
19 KiB
AWG2 Harness implementation spec
1. Architectural role
AWG2 Harness production package contains two Rust binaries:
awg2-harness— host-side traffic/firewall/status/swap orchestrator;awg2-reboot-scheduler— dedicated reboot scheduler service.
awg2-harness remains the main host-side multi-orchestrator for a dedicated Debian 13 amd64 AmneziaWG/AWG 2.0 server.
It owns the infrastructure state needed by the VPN service:
- Amnezia container discovery;
- container network namespace discovery;
- AWG/WG interface discovery;
- peer discovery;
- traffic-control desired state;
- IFB ingress shaping;
- nftables connection-count anti-torrent guard;
- Docker lifecycle recovery;
- periodic reconciliation;
- status/diagnostics;
- planned reboot;
- emergency swap setup.
It does not replace Amnezia. It controls the surrounding host-side infrastructure state required by the Amnezia service.
2. Process model
Two systemd services run:
/usr/sbin/awg2-harness --config /etc/awg2-harness/config.toml daemon
/usr/sbin/awg2-reboot-scheduler --config /etc/awg2-harness/config.toml
awg2-harness daemon starts as root and keeps running. On startup it performs initial reconcile. During runtime it reacts to Docker events and also runs a periodic reconcile loop.
Reboot scheduling authority belongs to awg2-reboot-scheduler service. awg2-harness does not schedule reboots internally.
Subcommands:
awg2-harness daemon
awg2-harness apply-limits
awg2-harness apply-network-tuning
awg2-harness inspect-network-tuning
awg2-harness apply-firewall
awg2-harness status
awg2-harness ensure-swap
awg2-harness validate-config
awg2-harness validate-runtime
apply-network-tuning/inspect-network-tuning относятся к отдельному host-level модулю sysctl_tuning.
Этот модуль:
- управляет только sysctl параметрами хоста;
- пишет только
/etc/sysctl.d/90-awg2-harness-vpn.conf; - применяет runtime-изменения точечно (
sysctl -w) только для drifted keys; - не использует
/etc/sysctl.confиsysctl --system; - не управляет
udp_wmem_min.
3. Module layout
Recommended Rust module split:
src/
├── main.rs
├── cli.rs
├── config.rs
├── daemon.rs
├── lock.rs
├── docker.rs
├── netns.rs
├── iface.rs
├── wg.rs
├── traffic/
│ ├── mod.rs
│ ├── model.rs
│ ├── inspect.rs
│ ├── apply.rs
│ ├── parse_tc.rs
│ └── commands.rs
├── firewall/
│ ├── mod.rs
│ ├── model.rs
│ ├── inspect.rs
│ ├── apply.rs
│ └── nft.rs
├── status.rs
├── swap.rs
└── error.rs
4. Core data model
The traffic module should operate on explicit model structs, not raw strings passed around the codebase.
Conceptual model:
struct RuntimeTarget {
container_name: String,
container_id: String,
container_pid: u32,
netns_path: PathBuf,
interface_name: String,
}
struct Peer {
public_key: Option<String>,
ipv4: Ipv4Addr,
cidr: u8, // normally 32
latest_handshake: Option<HandshakeAge>,
transfer_rx: Option<ByteSize>,
transfer_tx: Option<ByteSize>,
}
struct TrafficDesiredState {
iface: String,
ifb_name: String,
root_rate: Rate,
peer_limit: Rate,
class_start_id: u16,
peers: Vec<PeerTrafficClass>,
}
struct PeerTrafficClass {
peer_ip: Ipv4Addr,
class_id: u16,
}
Class assignment must be deterministic. Peer IP strings are sorted lexicographically, then assigned class_start_id + index. Do not silently switch this to numeric IPv4 sorting: the production class-id contract maps 10.8.1.10 before 10.8.1.2 because sorting is textual, not numeric.
5. Namespace strategy
Preferred strategy:
- Detect running container through Docker API or
docker ps/docker inspect. - Read container PID.
- Use
/proc/<pid>/ns/netas the target namespace. - Execute network operations in that namespace.
Implementation options:
- current path: spawn host tools with namespace entry, for example
nsenter -t <pid> -n tc ...,nsenter -t <pid> -n ip ...; - later/native: use netlink crates and explicit namespace switching where practical.
Peer state is the one exception and must never be read with a host-side binary.
AmneziaWG is a userspace implementation whose UAPI socket lives under
RUNSTATEDIR/amneziawg/<iface>.sock inside the container mount namespace, while host
wireguard-tools looks under /var/run/wireguard/. nsenter -n enters only the network
namespace, so a host wg reaches neither the socket nor a kernel device and always
returns an empty peer list. Peer discovery therefore uses docker exec exclusively, and
wireguard-tools is not a host dependency.
docker exec should not be the architectural default. It can remain as compatibility fallback if nsenter/host tools are unavailable, but the design assumption is that the Rust binary has host authority and controls the relevant namespace.
This also reduces operational risk: if the Amnezia container drops tc or iproute2, host-side tools can still apply rules inside the container netns.
6. Discovery flow
discover_target():
- Load ordered
amnezia.container_names. - Find the first running matching container.
- Get container ID, status and PID.
- Build
netns_path. - Detect interface in that namespace.
- Return
RuntimeTarget.
Interface detection order:
- Exact names from
amnezia.interface_candidates. - Pattern scan from
amnezia.interface_patterns. - Fallback: first non-loopback interface with IPv4 address, only if it is clearly inside the Amnezia namespace.
- If ambiguous, return an explicit error and do not apply rules.
7. Peer discovery
Transport is always docker exec <container> — see section 5 for why a host-side wg
cannot work.
Binary resolution uses ordered amnezia.wg_binaries, default ["awg", "wg"]. The first
binary that exits successfully wins. The official AmneziaWG image ships /usr/bin/awg and
symlinks /usr/bin/wg to it, so awg is the real dependency; wg remains for plain
WireGuard containers where awg does not exist. There is no probe call: the resolution is
a property of the command that is being run anyway.
Primary command:
awg show all allowed-ips
Parsing rules:
- parse lines structurally into peer public key and allowed IPs;
- a peer's allowed ips are space-separated in this command, comma-separated in
show all dumpand", "-separated in plainshow; all tokens from column 3 onward must be consumed, otherwise peers with more than one allowed IP are shaped only on their first address; - keep IPv4
/32addresses withinamnezia.peer_ipv4_cidr; - include offline peers; online state is not a requirement for shaping;
- sort peer IP strings lexicographically before class assignment to preserve the current lexicographic class-id contract.
Fallback:
awg show
The fallback parser should support standard wg show text output by extracting allowed ips: lines.
show all dump line classification:
- a line is a peer line only if it has at least 9 tab-separated columns, column 5
(allowed ips) is
(none)or a comma-separated CIDR list, and columns 6-8 (handshake, rx, tx) all parse as integers; - column count is not a discriminator on its own: the AmneziaWG interface line carries the AWG parameters and is longer than a peer line (14 columns for AWG 2.0, 28 for AWG 3.0), and its handshake/rx/tx positions hold junk-packet sizes that parse as integers;
- this matters beyond correctness — column 2 of an interface line is the device private key, so a misclassified interface line would surface it as a peer public key;
- AWG 3.0 prints protocol timers as ranges (
20-30). The peer keepalive column is not read, and a range value must not break parsing.
Execution policy for production:
- do not use shell wrappers (
sh -c) forwginvocation; - do not suppress stderr via redirection in command strings;
- execute the binary directly and handle non-zero exit codes in Rust;
amnezia.wg_binariesvalues are executed inside the container and are validated as bare command names: non-empty, no whitespace, no path separators.
8. Desired traffic topology
The expected topology is the AWG2 traffic topology contract.
Egress:
tc qdisc add dev <iface> root handle 1: htb
tc class add dev <iface> parent 1: classid 1:1 htb rate <root_rate> ceil <root_rate>
for each peer:
tc class add dev <iface> parent 1:1 classid 1:<id> htb rate <peer_limit> ceil <peer_limit>
tc qdisc add dev <iface> parent 1:<id> fq_codel
tc filter add dev <iface> parent 1: protocol ip u32 match ip dst <peer_ip> flowid 1:<id>
Ingress through IFB:
modprobe ifb
ip link add name <ifb_name> type ifb
ip link set dev <ifb_name> up
tc qdisc add dev <iface> handle ffff: ingress
tc filter add dev <iface> parent ffff: protocol all u32 match u32 0 0 action mirred egress redirect dev <ifb_name>
tc qdisc add dev <ifb_name> root handle 2: htb
tc class add dev <ifb_name> parent 2: classid 2:1 htb rate <root_rate> ceil <root_rate>
for each peer:
tc class add dev <ifb_name> parent 2:1 classid 2:<id> htb rate <peer_limit> ceil <peer_limit>
tc qdisc add dev <ifb_name> parent 2:<id> fq_codel
tc filter add dev <ifb_name> parent 2: protocol ip u32 match ip src <peer_ip> flowid 2:<id>
9. Reconcile algorithm
Pseudo-flow:
reconcile_traffic():
acquire global lock
target = discover_target()
peers = discover_peers(target)
if peers empty:
log and return NoPeers
desired = build_desired_state(target, peers, config)
actual = inspect_actual_state(target, desired)
drift = diff(desired, actual)
firewall_desired = build_firewall_desired_state(target, config)
firewall_actual = inspect_firewall_state(target, firewall_desired)
firewall_drift = diff(firewall_desired, firewall_actual)
if drift.none and firewall_drift.none:
log "rules already up-to-date"
return NoChange
if drift.exists:
teardown_owned_topology(target, desired)
apply_full_topology(target, desired)
verify_after_apply(target, desired)
if firewall_drift.exists:
apply_owned_firewall_table(target, firewall_desired)
verify_firewall_after_apply(target, firewall_desired)
For production, controlled full rebuild on drift is the only supported path.
Parser hardening requirements:
tc filter showmust be parsed block-by-block (state-machine), not by naive token scanning across unrelated lines;- mapping
peer_ip -> class_idmust be validated for both egress (1:) and ingress (2:) sides; - verification must fail when classes/filters exist but mapping differs from deterministic assignment.
Apply/verify policy:
- all apply steps are explicit command invocations;
- expected idempotency conflicts (
already exists) may be tolerated selectively; - any other apply error is fatal;
verify_after_applyis mandatory for both traffic and anti-torrent subsystems.
Anti-torrent observability contract:
- named counter
antitorrent_dropped_v4must be present in owned table; - status output must expose both dropped packets and dropped bytes.
10. Owned state and teardown rules
The binary owns:
- root qdisc
1:on selected AWG/WG interface; - ingress qdisc
ffff:on selected AWG/WG interface when traffic limits are enabled; - IFB device named
traffic.ifb_name, defaultifb0, in the target namespace; - root qdisc
2:on IFB; - classes and filters under these handles.
Teardown may delete and recreate these owned objects. Because the server is dedicated, this is acceptable and preferable to leaving stale or partial rules.
The binary should not blindly flush unrelated host firewall rules, Docker NAT rules, or unrelated interfaces. Firewall ownership must be explicit and scoped to the AWG2 Harness table, for example table inet awg2_harness, inside the target network namespace.
11. Anti-torrent firewall guard
This is part of the AWG2 production contract. It fits the multi-orchestrator model because the server is dedicated and the binary is allowed to own host/network rules required for the VPN product. The rule must still be scoped narrowly and observable.
Goal: limit concurrent conntrack flows per VPN peer IP. This is not torrent protocol detection. It is a generic connection-count guard that makes high-peer-count P2P workloads unattractive while leaving normal browsing, streaming, gaming and messaging traffic unaffected.
The rule must not be implemented as a global subnet limit:
ip saddr 10.8.1.0/24 ct count over 200 drop
That form can become one shared counter for the whole matched traffic set, depending on how it is written and where it is placed. For per-peer behavior, key the stateful object by source VPN IP. Recommended shape:
table inet awg2_harness {
counter antitorrent_dropped_v4 {}
chain forward_antitorrent {
type filter hook forward priority filter; policy accept;
ip saddr <peer_ipv4_cidr> ct state new \
meter awg2_peer_connlimit_v4 { ip saddr ct count over <max_connections_per_peer> } \
counter name antitorrent_dropped_v4 \
drop
}
}
Target namespace: the same Amnezia network namespace where tc shaping is applied. Do not assume the initial host namespace sees original peer source addresses. If Amnezia performs NAT inside the container namespace, the host Docker bridge may only see the container address, not 10.8.1.x.
Default threshold: 100 concurrent flows per peer IP. 150 is the conservative compatibility setting if there are complaints from unusually connection-heavy WebSocket/WebRTC/trading-browser workloads. 70 is more aggressive and should only be used after real traffic observation.
Rule placement: use forward hook with priority filter or any priority after conntrack lookup. Restrict evaluation to ct state new so established flows continue normally and only new flow attempts beyond the threshold are dropped.
Owned state:
- table
inet awg2_harness; - chain
forward_antitorrent; - counter
antitorrent_dropped_v4; - meter/set state created by the rule.
Status must show whether the table/chain/rule exists, the configured threshold, the peer CIDR, and the drop counter. It should also expose host conntrack pressure from net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_count and net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_max when available.
If anti_torrent.enabled = false, the daemon should remove or leave inactive only the AWG2-owned anti-torrent table according to config policy. It must never flush the global nftables ruleset.
12. Actual-state inspection
inspect_actual_state() must collect enough information to diagnose drift:
- qdisc on
<iface>; - classes on
<iface>; - qdiscs attached to per-peer classes on
<iface>; - filters under parent
1:on<iface>; - ingress qdisc on
<iface>; - ingress redirect filter on
<iface>; - existence and state of
<ifb_name>; - qdisc on
<ifb_name>; - classes on
<ifb_name>; - filters under parent
2:on<ifb_name>.
status should display a compact summary and optionally a verbose mode for raw tc sections.
13. Docker events and periodic reconciliation
The daemon should use two triggers:
- Docker events: container start/restart signals cause delayed reconcile after interface readiness.
- Timer: periodic reconcile every
traffic.reconcile_interval_secs.
The timer is mandatory. Events can be missed during daemon restart, Docker restart or transient errors.
Readiness check must not hardcode awg0. It must call the shared interface detector until timeout.
14. Locking
Only one traffic reconcile may run at a time across all subcommands and daemon tasks.
Recommended lock:
/run/awg2-harness/traffic.lock
Behavior:
daemonskips overlapping reconcile and logs it;- manual
apply-limitseither waits briefly or exits with a clear message; - lock release is automatic when process exits.
15. Status output contract
awg2-harness status should show:
System:
service: active/inactive/unknown
docker: available/unavailable
container: name, id, status, pid
netns: /proc/<pid>/ns/net
interface: awg0/wg0/...
Peers:
total: N
each peer: ip, optional public key prefix, handshake, rx/tx
Traffic desired:
peer_limit, root_rate, ifb_name, class_start_id
Traffic actual:
egress qdisc/classes/filters: ok/drift
ingress redirect: ok/drift
ifb topology: ok/drift
stale peers: list
missing peers: list
Anti-torrent actual:
enabled: true/false
nft table/chain/rule: ok/drift
max_connections_per_peer
dropped_new_flows counter
conntrack_count / conntrack_max if available
Last actions:
last reconcile result
last error if any
A generic status banner like “system ready” is not enough. Rust status must be falsifiable: it should clearly say when state is partial.
16. Reboot module integration
Production reboot path is external binary/service awg2-reboot-scheduler:
- window from config, not constants;
- random point inside reboot window (including cross-midnight windows);
systemctl --no-block rebootremains;- disabled when
reboot.enabled = false; - planned reboot timestamp is persisted in
/run/awg2-harness/reboot.plan.
17. Swap module
ensure-swap desired state:
- path from config, default
/swapfile; - size 2048 MB;
- mode
0600; mkswapcompleted;- active in
swapon --show; - one
/etc/fstabentry with configured priority; vm.swappiness = 1persisted and applied.
When swap.enabled=true, AWG2 Harness owns host swap state exclusively.
The desired state is exactly one active swap entry: swap.path.
All other active swap devices/files are disabled via swapoff.
All non-comment swap entries in /etc/fstab are removed and replaced by one managed AWG2 entry.
Regular-file swapfiles that are not the configured swap.path may be deleted only after successful swapoff.
Block devices are never deleted, only disabled and removed from fstab.
The operation must be idempotent.
18. Testing
Unit tests:
- config validation, including
amnezia.wg_binariesshape; awg|wg show all allowed-ipsparser, including multiple space-separated allowed ips;awg|wg showfallback parser;awg|wg show all dumppeer/interface line classification against AWG 3.0 (28 columns), AWG 2.0 (14 columns) and plain WireGuard (5 columns) interface lines;- wg binary resolution order and the error raised when no binary is available;
- CIDR filtering;
- deterministic class assignment with lexicographic class-id stability contract;
- nftables ruleset rendering and parsing for the AWG2-owned table;
tcparser for qdisc/class/filter snapshots;- drift diff;
- reboot window calculation;
- fstab/sysctl idempotency.
Integration tests on real host:
- initial apply;
- repeated apply;
- partial state recovery after deleting only ingress qdisc;
- partial state recovery after deleting
ifb0; - container restart;
- Docker restart;
- host reboot;
- peer addition;
- peer deletion;
- status output in healthy and broken states;
- anti-torrent rule counter increments when a peer exceeds the configured concurrent-flow threshold;
- anti-torrent disable path does not flush unrelated nftables/Docker/Amnezia rules.